Drug cryptomarkets in the 2020s: policy, enforcement, harm, and resilience. by Horton-Eddison, Martin et al.
ISSN  2054-1910
Drug Cryptomarkets in the 2020s: 
Policy, Enforcement, Harm, and Resilience
Martin Horton-Eddison ∗, Patrick Shortis a, Judith Aldridge ¥, 
Fernando Caudevilla p  
Policy Brief 16, June 2021
KEY POINTS 
• Despite repeated recommendations from the UN General Assembly and several UN subsidiary
bodies since 2013, there remains an absence of a single UN cybercrime convention, with
specific provision for the illegal trade in drugs online.
• In this absence – and a decade after the founding of the original drug cryptomarket (Silk
Road) - the standard and longstanding strategic enforcement model of ‘takedown’ endures.
• Evidence suggests that takedown is ineffective at reducing the size or scope of the illicit
trade, increases market proliferation, and catalyses wide-spread market innovation,
adaptation, and target hardening across the environment. This increases resource
requirements exponentially, with ever-decreasing returns.
• It is likely that the current rate of technological evolution will create a shift to market types
that lack some of the harm-reducing benefits of cryptomarkets, and that are more resource-
intensive for law enforcement to monitor.
• New market types - encrypted apps or other peer-to-peer market platforms - lack some of the 
beneficial features that cryptomarkets provide over offline markets, reducing opportunities
for harm reduction advice to reach users effectively. They may also increase the complexity
of the response required (and the ability) of law enforcement agencies to curtail injurious
elements of the online trade.
• Policies that encourage a nuanced enforcement approach – away from blanket takedown
- might more efficiently focus limited human and financial resources only on the most
injurious of substances and markets, freeing skilled cybercrime specialists to prioritise more
pernicious criminal activities online, such as terrorism and child sexual exploitation.
• Such a guided approach might also ameliorate the negative consequences of takedown
operations for ongoing harm reduction efforts, including for substance testing services
that rely on drug cryptomarkets as conduits through which to communicate life-saving
information.
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INTRODUCTION
This GDPO Policy Brief is intended to inform 
policy-makers, practitioners, and other actors 
of the latest developments – and likely future 
direction – of Drug Cryptomarkets (DCM). 
It draws together several complementary 
active research strands to provide a timely 
trend analysis of the current and future 
state of the DCM landscape, clarifies the 
impact of a decade of counter-DCM policy 
and enforcement strategy on market 
development, and proposes suggestions for 
future enforcement strategies and wider 
policy guidance for the coming decade. We 
begin by detailing the history of counter-DCM 
operations to illustrate current and historic 
methods of enforcement. The brief identifies 
several likely future market innovations 
and trends for the coming decade. We then 
analyse the consequences of takedown 
on efforts to reduce some of the harms 
associated with DCM use, exemplified by the 
experiences of a high-profile drug checking 
service1 located at the nexus of DCMs and 
harm reduction efforts. Finally, the brief 
presents a number of suggestions for policy-
makers and enforcement practitioners. These 
include improving formal policy guidance to 
inform an adapted enforcement approach 
that prioritises targeting only the most 
injurious of vendors and markets, slowing 
the rate of innovation attrition, improving 
enforcement efficacy, and supporting ongoing 
harm reduction efforts.
TAKEDOWN: POLICY, AND ENFORCEMENT
The first law enforcement ‘takedown’ of 
an internet drugs market occurred in mid-
1999, after US authorities noted an increase 
in smuggling by mail of significant quantities 
of controlled pharmaceuticals including 
alprazolam, diazepam, and codeine from 
Thailand. Investigations exposed three 
separate Thai-based vendor operators 
who were advertising substances on the 
internet in contravention of Article 3 of the 
1988 convention and Article 10 of the 1971 
convention.2 Enforcement moved quickly: 
administrators were arrested, and servers 
unplugged. Over a decade after the Thailand 
takedown, the advent of drug cryptomarkets 
in 2011 represented a step-change in drug 
market innovation. Having evolved since the 
Thai operation, cryptomarkets are built on 
three core technologies; anonymising internet 
technologies including the onion router (TOR) 
or i2p to enable anonymous browsing and 
hosting, cryptocurrencies to enable ‘digital 
cash’ transactions, and escrow payment 
systems to facilitate trust in anonymous 
financial transactions by protecting buyers 
and vendors.3 A decade after the founding 
(2011) - and 8 years since the takedown by 
law enforcement - of the original DCM (Silk 
Road) (2013), cryptomarkets now represent 
an established and maturing issue area for 
international drug control. Yet, despite the 
longevity and resilience of DCMs, enforcement 
practices nevertheless remain both rooted 
in the takedown principle first evidenced 
in the Thai operation and underpinned by 
international conventions that pre-date the 
advent of the internet itself. 
Moreover, despite more recent high-profile (and 
increasingly sophisticated) law enforcement 
actions, DCMs nevertheless continue to 
function in 2021, and look set to continue 
operations – albeit in altering form - into 
the next decade. Indeed, 2020 data suggest4 
that purchases of drugs on cryptomarkets 
“After we took down Hansa and 
Alphabay [in July 2017], we conducted 
a study on the type of impact the 
takedown provided and we realised 
that indeed it had a short life in terms 
of significant impact”
 
- EUROPOL Delegate, Remarks made to the 
Plenary, 61st CND 4th Intersessional, October 
2018, Vienna, 23rd October 2018
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continue to grow in Europe both before, 
during, and after the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. 
The majority of substances bought and sold 
on these markets are typically described as 
‘recreational’5 with cannabis by far the most 
commonly traded substance.6 However the 
markets are also involved in the supply of 
synthetic opioids – specifically fentanyl and 
fentanyl analogues – substances implicated 
in compounding the (predominantly) United 
States’ ongoing opioid crisis.7 
At the international level, despite repeated 
official calls that ‘something must be done’ 
about DCMs - a comprehensive codified 
international approach nevertheless remains 
elusive. The United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime’s (UNODC’s) own 20138 call9 for a 
dedicated international cybercrime instrument 
is yet to bear fruit, despite recent moves under 
the mandate of General Assembly resolution 
74/247. Instead, limited DCM policy guidance 
is distributed in snippets across several 
disparate United Nations (UN) resolutions and 
statements. These are largely generalist in 
nature; the Commission on Narcotic Drugs’ 
(CND) Resolution 50/11 Paragraph 5 (2007) 
simply requests that member states provide 
‘assistance and equipment in support of 
both the International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB) and UNODC’s efforts’10 against 
online sales. Over a decade since resolution 
50/11– and in similar language - the INCB’s 
Recommendations to Governments (2018) 
suggests that states should provide ‘details 
from online sales, suspicious shipments, drug 
or illicit laboratory seizures.’11 That same year, 
then UNODC executive director Yuri Fedotov 
pressed the ‘importance of coordinated’12 
international police operations to address the 
issue. However, as recently as 2018 EUROPOL’s 
Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(IOCTA) continued to decry the lack of a 
credible ‘international strategy to address the 
abuse of the dark web.’13 Recent work under 
General Assembly resolution 74/247 show 
little evidence of any attempt to incorporate 
specific DCM guidance. More broadly, to 
illustrate how little progress has been made 
since Resolution 50/11 (2007), the head of the 
UN agency tasked with combatting the use of 
cryptocurrency for money laundering – the 
GPML14 - acknowledged that coordination and 
collaboration does not even occur between 
the GPML and the INCB - despite both bodies 
being located on the same floor of the same 
building in Vienna.15 
Given the absence (at the time of writing) 
of a formal codified cyber-crime agreement 
- and in the face of disparate and generalist 
international guidance - it is hardly surprising 
that coordination of enforcement is both ad-
hoc and sporadic. When coordination between 
national and international enforcement 
does occur, it is directed not by top-down 
international policy guidance, but by bottom-
up enforcement practices. In effect, the result 
is enforcement-led policy, rather than policy-
led enforcement. 
In this vacuum, domestic and international 
law enforcement have defaulted to their stock 
trade of busts and seizures. Consequently, 
counter-DCM operations appear as reactive 
market takedowns; DCMs are typically 
removed by means of server seizure and the 
apprehension of administration staff in the 
same way as they have been since the Thai 
operation in 1999, the Silk Road operation in 
2013, the takedown of 9 DCMs in 2014, and 
subsequent operations discussed in this brief. 
At their core, takedown strategies represent 
a ‘one shot deal’ that rarely considers the 
medium- to long-term consequences of market 
removal. Medium-to long-term consequences 
may be better understood if directed by a 
more comprehensive international position; 
one that accounts for a need to achieve the 
highest attainable standard of health, for 
which states and the international community 
have primary responsibility.16 
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CONSEQUENCES OF TAKEDOWN 
OPERATIONS
Aside from the immediate closure of a specific 
market, known consequences of takedown 
include accelerating market proliferation, 
impelling the development of technologies 
designed to evade detection by law 
enforcement,17 galvanising long-term impact 
on cryptomarket activity,18 and removing 
sources of live data for trend and substance 
analysis at all levels.19 Market takedowns also 
significantly impede previously successful 
efforts to effectively reduce some of the harms 
associated with illegal drug consumption20 
including disconnecting communication 
channels between those monitoring substances 
and the buyers and vendors who trade in them. 
Impact on Sales
Research shows that takedowns have a short-
term impact because users simply migrate to 
other platforms to continue trading. Measuring 
overall trade volume on cryptomarkets by the 
feedback left by customers21 evidences that 
following the takedown of the Silk Road, sales 
volume across DCMs returned to a pre-bust level 
within four months.22 After the 2014 closure of 
multiple markets in Operation Onymous, the 
number of feedbacks left on markets exceeded 
pre-bust levels within two months.23 Whilst 
the 2017 operation to close both Alphabay 
and Hansa Market may have been technically 
and tactically sophisticated, the impacts were 
again short-lived; evidence shows that overall 
trade volume across cryptomarkets recovered 
within a month of the Alphabay closure, and 
in a matter of weeks after the Hansa Market 
closure. 24 In short, markets and users seem to be 
recovering faster from disturbances caused by 
law enforcement operations and cryptomarkets 
continue to grow in number and patronage. 
Target Hardening
Law enforcement efforts to suppress 
conventional drug markets has long been shown 
to result in so-called ‘target hardening’ by 
market actors, spurring marketplace innovation 
aimed at reducing the vulnerability of drug 
suppliers to detection and arrest.25 We have 
seen substantial innovation in cryptomarket 
structures, security innovations and practices 
following law enforcement operations. One 
empirical study26 showed how the FBI’s seizure 
of the original Silk Road market helped 
accelerate the adoption of innovative multi-
signature escrow technologies in replacement 
markets. This might usefully be described as 
an ‘enforcement-innovation paradox’, where 
each enforcement activity increases the level 
of resources and skills required to prosecute 
the next. Moreover, even though the lifespan 
of individual cryptomarket platforms is often 
short-lived, the entire ecosystem has tended 
to be highly resilient to law enforcement 
seizures of marketplaces, displacing vendors 
to alternative markets after which time sales 
again grow.27 This “hydra effect”28 is similar in 
conception to market fragmentation following 
enforcement activities against offline supply. 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION – FUTURE 
TRENDS FOR THE 2020S
At present, cryptomarkets continue to respond to 
improvements in law enforcement investigative 
capacity by developing tradecraft and new 
market features. Continued destabilisation 
of cryptomarket platforms could ultimately 
result in wholesale shifts towards new market 
types such as encrypted apps or other peer-to-
peer (P2P) market platforms. These emerging 
platforms lack many or all of the third party 
services provided by existing cryptomarket 
platform types, specifically; collated seller 
reliability metrics, escrow payment protection, 
centralised administration. As such, they 
provide fewer opportunities for harm reduction 
advice to reach users effectively, and curtail law 
enforcement’s ability to engage in enforcement 
activities. Although some significant migration 
in this regard has already been observed, this is 
not yet at a point where a wholesale shift away 
from TOR has happened. It is our evidenced-
based view that continued reliance on taking 
down markets will accelerate migration to 
emerging platforms. 
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In a similar vein, recent shifts in tradecraft 
as a response to enforcement activity already 
include improvements in Bitcoin privacy and 
the widespread adoption of Monero,29 which 
severely limits the capacity of law enforcement 
to reveal buyer and seller identities via 
blockchain analysis.30 Whilst Bitcoin continues 
to be the most popular cryptocurrency, the 
relative ease with which it can be deanonymized 
through blockchain analysis has led to the 
development of mixing protocol technologies 
like CoinJoin31 and Wasabi32 wallet. These 
technologies enhance Bitcoin privacy by mixing 
the transactions of multiple users together to 
obfuscate identities, use TOR to obfuscate 
traffic, and are reportedly creating challenges 
for blockchain analysis companies and law 
enforcement investigations.33 Monero - a more 
anonymous alternative to Bitcoin - and one 
that has stymied several law enforcement 
investigations - is now widely adopted across 
most cryptomarkets, with an increasing number 
actively encouraging its use over Bitcoin.34 
In tandem with an effort to deny law 
enforcement investigatory leads through 
blockchain analysis, market staff have also 
learnt that digital traces left on markets pose 
threats for all users, and are attempting to 
reduce those traces and improve security. 
Current market leader (Feb 2021) White House 
Market uses Monero as its primary payment 
method and forces the use of pretty good 
privacy (PGP) encryption for all activities 
including orders and messages, with the 
purpose of denying law enforcement access 
to these sources of information in the event 
of a market seizure35. For example, Monopoly 
market launched as a Monero-only market 
with a new order process that signals a shift 
towards de facto decentralisation: Instead of 
creating accounts to purchase from, customers 
make orders directly from vendors and are 
given an order number they can use to track 
the progress of their purchase. The market 
allows for optional payment by escrow, but 
the system encourages direct dealing, with 
the market collecting monthly fees from its 
pre-vetted vendors. Therefore, in the event 
of market seizure by law enforcement, no 
customer order data will be available to law 
enforcement agencies. In this way, Monopoly is 
marginally more decentralised than some of its 
peer markets, with the administrator playing 
less of a direct role in the purchasing process. 
Whilst this innovation protects customer data, 
it also removes a communication channel 
between the administrator and customers; 
buyers do not have an account inbox that 
they can receive messages (including harm 
reduction announcements) through.
Both White House and Monopoly markets issue 
rigorous guides on reducing the risk of engaging 
in the cryptomarket trade, including detailed 
instructions for improving user operational 
security practices. In the face of law 
enforcement takedown operations, platform 
administrators and staff have responded by 
improving the security behaviours of their 
users to lower the likelihood of apprehension. 
This sort of innovation is critical in a context 
where arrests are enabled by mistakes on 
the part of users that leave digital evidence 
trails. To illustrate; the seizure of Wall Street 
Market in 2019 precipitated the arrest of 
179 vendors around the world. The operation 
used data gleaned from the seizure of the 
market’s servers including unencrypted 
messages between vendors and customers 
“Since the suspect used a combination 
of Tor and [Monero], we could not 
trace the funds. We could not trace 
the IP-addresses. Which means, we 
hit the end of the road. Whatever 
happened on the Bitcoin blockchain 
was visible and that’s why we were 
able to get reasonably far. But with 
Monero blockchain, that was the point 
where the investigation has ended”. 
– Europol Analyst Jarek Jakubchek - Blockchain 
Alliance Webinar on Privacy Coins, December 
10, 2019
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that contained users’ physical addresses and 
the digital addresses of their bitcoin wallets.36 
Accordingly, if cryptomarket administrators 
continue to work diligently to enforce Monero 
adoption and PGP encryption than we can 
expect future market takedowns to net 
diminishing intelligence returns. 
More broadly, the threat of law enforcement 
coupled with the onslaught of distributed-
denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks over the 
last year37 have had a galvanising effect on 
innovation in cryptomarkets. Combined, 
they may partially account for a slow but 
growing shift to peer-to-peer (P2P) market 
platforms. For several years, researchers and 
cryptomarket watchers have voiced concerns 
about cryptomarket drug transactions 
moving from centralised cryptomarkets 
to decentralised P2P trade platforms like 
OpenBazaar or selling over chat applications 
such as Wickr and Telegram. Decentralized 
markets remove some of the positive aspects 
of cryptomarkets that customers enjoy and 
are harder for law enforcement agencies 
to police.38 At present cryptomarkets are 
centralised platforms that provide third party 
services in return for a commission on sales. 
By contrast, in a decentralised model each 
vendor has full control over all aspects of 
trade. Without centralised control over the 
systems for payments, disputes and reviews, 
and an active discussion forum space, the 
incentives for vendors to be honest about 
the quality and consistency of their products 
are reduced without independently verified 
customer feedback or the threat of being 
removed from the platform. 
In spite of the comparative disadvantage of 
decentralised platforms for drug trading by 
comparison to cryptomarkets, over the past 
two years we have witnessed a slow trickle of 
users to encrypted chat platforms like Wickr for 
direct dealing with vendors. Some users move 
to Wickr because of the increasingly complex 
nature of DCMs as a barrier to access.39. With 
the recent launch of Televend - a Telegram-
based autoshop system we may find even 
more buyers and sellers considering taking 
their chances with direct dealing.40 Televend, 
whilst still to some degree centralised in its 
infrastructure, fees and review system, is 
likely to become an increasingly attractive 
option due to reduced market downtimes. 
It may also pose new problems for police 
investigations, including the inability to 
takedown the server without also removing 
the Telegram app: Law enforcement agencies 
should therefore consider carefully what kind 
of enforcement strategies they employ.
ROLE OF DRUG CRYPTOMARKETS IN 
REDUCING HARMS
Research suggests that some of the harms of 
drug use that are created by prohibition may 
to an extent be reduced by the cryptomarket 
drug trade.41 Customer feedback metrics 
and escrow payment protection combine to 
encourage and reward vendor accountability. 
Compared to offline drug buyers therefore, 
cryptomarket buyers may be more likely to 
obtain a higher quality and ‘as advertised’ 
products. This is important because some 
drug harms arise from uncertain content and 
strength, thereby creating the risk of unwanted 
effects or overdose. Cryptomarket vendors 
often provide warnings associated with high-
purity products, allowing users to make better-
informed decisions about product choice and 
dosage, and may therefore function to reduce 
harms associated with accessing products in 
offline drug markets. 
In addition, cryptomarket discussion forums 
have provided a rich source of drug safety 
information (e.g., quality, purity, adulterants, 
dosing), enabling buyers and vendors alike to 
share information about product and batch 
content, and about buying and selling more 
safely. This kind of information is not typically 
available on popular and reputable drug-safety 
forums on the clearnet (e.g., Bluelight.org), as 
these sites usually have policies that explicitly 
ban discussion related to drug supply.  Other 
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clearnet discussion locations (Reddit groups) 
have been closed following legal rulings in 
the US, making the existence and support of 
DCM forums even more important. The quality 
and accuracy of information generated in 
marketplace discussion forums is - of course 
- not guaranteed, and inaccurate information 
could potentially increase the risk of harmful 
outcomes. However, in cases of best practice 
cryptomarkets have facilitated discussion 
threads hosted by qualified drug harm 
reduction professionals, often resulting in 
high-quality drug safety information being 
made permanently archived for users.
Case Study: Active Harm Reduction Initiatives 
As early as the first iteration of the Silk Road, 
Dr Fernando Caudevilla42 (aka “Dr X”) provided 
expert medical harm reduction advice to 
buyers and vendors on DCMs. Information was 
provided to drug users who sought advice 
they felt unable or unwilling to seek from 
offline or even clearnet medical professionals. 
Questions included how controlled substances 
might interact with prescribed substances, on 
how to manage adverse effects, psychiatric 
conditions, help with abuse or dependence, and 
advice to expectant or breastfeeding mothers. 
In the years immediately after the Silk Road 
takedown, users on replacement markets 
including Silk Road 2.0 and Evolution continued 
to seek advice, resulting in tens of thousands 
of views of medical advice posted in reply to 
specific questions on discussion forums. 
Today, Dr Caudevilla works for Energy Control, 
an organisation that since 2014 has combined 
a comprehensive international drug checking 
service with expert medical harm-reduction 
information, personal medical advice and 
education to service users from around the 
world. Energy Control’s drug checking service 
is well-used by those buying drugs through 
online markets. Energy Control provides 
colorimetric, thin layer chromatographic, 
and mass spectrophotometric testing to 
analyse content and purity of substances 
bought online. The results allow users to 
make informed choices to reject and dispose 
of contaminated or dangerous substances, 
helping to reduce risk, prevent overdose, 
and to minimise medical complications that 
may arise from use. Significantly, Energy 
Control’s testing of samples acquired on 
drug cryptomarkets also feeds data into 
the UNODC’s scientific research, providing 
valuable information for policy-makers and 
practitioners at all levels. 
In operational terms, test results from 
cryptomarket drug purchases enable Energy 
Control to contact cryptomarket platform 
administrators to inform them of unexpected 
and potentially more dangerous substances 
being sold. Energy Control data has already 
identified suppliers of fentanyl-adulterated 
heroin samples and communicated those 
results through clear web and cryptomarket 
forums, resulting in listings being removed 
and vendors banned by market administrators. 
These positive harm-reducing initiatives are 
only possible because drug cryptomarkets 
exist in their well-known centralised form. 
When law enforcement closes marketplaces, 
gone too are the possibilities for providing 
tailored advice, test results, and safety 
information to people who use drugs: access 
to the vulnerable populations is stymied 
by takedowns. Moreover, whilst drug 
cryptomarkets remain centralised platforms 
managed by administrators, it is still possible 
to communicate directly with those capable 
of removing listings or vendor accounts. As 
See also: 
Caudevilla, F., The emergence of 
deep web marketplaces: a health 
perspective. In European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(Ed.), The internet and drug markets 
(EMCDDA Insights 21) (pp. 69-75). 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of 
the EU., 2016 
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the ecosystem innovates to a decentralised 
model of peer-to-peer hosted vendor shops 
as discussed earlier (e.g., Televend), then 
providing information and having bad actors 
removed becomes less feasible, so reducing 
the efficacy of some valuable harm reduction-
oriented initiatives.
Social Harms
Cryptomarkets may, additionally, reduce the 
likelihood of violence associated to the trade 
in illegal drugs43. Because transactions occur 
online, opportunities for violence will be 
substantially fewer than where transactions 
are face-to-face. Moreover, cryptomarket 
platform features, like escrow and dispute 
adjudication, may function to reduce the 
kinds of conflict that give rise to violence. 
Because cryptomarkets serve an – albeit 
limited – wholesale function,44 violence 
reduction may also apply for the stock sourcing 
purchases where offline drug violence is more 
concentrated. However, as the number of 
market takedowns and arrests increase, trust 
in the cryptomarket eco-system may, in turn, 
be eroded, thereby impacting otherwise more 
peaceable trading, resulting in increased 
conflict and violence. 
Self-Regulation 
Cryptomarkets can be understood as platforms 
that function to regulate illicit drug trading 
by virtue of the third-party services (e.g., 
escrow, dispute adjudication) that mimic 
those available in legal markets. Since 2011, 
markets have been observed engaging in self-
regulatory behaviours. Most notably, these 
include banning and vetting particular products 
and services.45 Such initiatives are aimed not 
just at reducing trading disputes, but also 
at reducing wider drug harms by removing 
or banning specific substances known to be 
injurious to users. Indeed, Vince O’Brien of the 
UK National Crime Agency (NCA) noted that 
some vendors on DCMs appeared to be self-
enforcing the broader international position 
on fentanyl, removing listings and banning 
vendors who flouted the rules.46 Indeed, Dream 
Market self-regulated (removed) all product 
listings and proscribed fentanyl products 
alongside assassinations, child pornography, 
and weapons of mass destruction. However, 
a few DCMs continued to feature fentanyl 
products openly. Moreover, several markets 
– most notably the Russian-hosted Tochka 
Market - continued to list the substance for 
international delivery via major international 
postal carriers. O’Brien speculated that 
vendors and markets were voluntarily delisting 
fentanyl due to intense moral concerns about 
the proportionately high death rate. This may 
not be entirely altruistic behaviour; if law 
enforcement prioritise actions against vendors 
trading in particularly injurious substances, 
vendors and platforms supporting bans on 
these substances may be operating with self-
interest. A 2021 Australian study found that 
law enforcement interventions that targeted 
specific substances – such as fentanyl – and 
only those markets implicated in their sale is a 
particularly effective approach.47 Furthermore, 
recently evolved law enforcement strategies 
that first undermine trust in live DCMs (before 
ultimately taking them down) may also 
contribute to DCM self-regulation. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Default takedown enforcement models closely 
resemble the decapitation strategies used 
throughout the ‘war on drugs’ in the offline 
world. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this has had 
similar effects online; the fragmentation of 
markets, acquisition of new skills and tools 
on behalf of traffickers, and the creation of 
markets that are increasingly driven by profit 
incentives fuelled by the consequential risk/
reward quotient. More recent counter-darknet 
law enforcement operations – most notably 
Operations Gravesac and Bayonet48 - have 
begun to accommodate changing enforcement 
practices, including undermining general trust 
in the markets, using the markets as live 
sources of intelligence, and even managing 
live DCMs as part of operations. Operations 
like these depend on centralised market 
designs with servers and administrators at the 
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helm. However, recent market innovations 
are accelerating technical change toward 
decentralisation. At the same time, cybercrime 
investigatory skills (and personnel) are also 
deployed against a range of online issues 
including countering child abuse, the trade in 
illegal firearms, fraud and money laundering, 
and terrorism activities. Finite enforcement 
resources are understandably stretched. 
As such, enforcement practices logically 
require revision, but this is problematic in an 
enforcement-led policy environment devoid of 
codified international guidance. A cybercrime 
convention with specific provision for drug 
cryptomarket guidance would be a useful 
first step toward acknowledging the negative 
consequences of the existing approach. It might 
also see the online trade in drugs as part of a 
more holistic approach to cybercrime. One 
benefit might be that the cryptomarket drug 
trade is recognised as a lower-order priority 
– at both the international and enforcement 
level - compared to the online trade in child 
abuse material, terrorism, and the trade in 
weapons. However, to be successful, any formal 
agreement must recognise the harm-reducing 
realities of drug cryptomarkets and respond 
accordingly, although what this might look like 
in practice is less clear. One approach might 
be to prioritise enforcement against only those 
vendors and markets that permit the trade 
in particularly injurious substances including 
fentanyl and fentanyl analogues. De-prioritising 
the trade in recreational drugs would not only 
slow the rate of technological innovation in 
response to takedown operations, but also 
liberate cybercrime enforcement practitioners 
to focus skills, time, and financial resources on 
those more pernicious cybercrimes as described. 
It is recognised that regulating the production, 
use, or trade in internationally controlled 
substances for non-medical and non-scientific 
purposes is neither within the spirit nor letter 
of the existing drug control conventions. That 
said, the protection of public health has always 
been a key overarching aim of the existing 
treaties, and of intersecting institutions. Any 
new cybercrime instrument – if inclusive of 
specific provision for drug cryptomarkets - and 
that interlocks with the existing prohibition-
oriented architecture, might facilitate a 
targeted approach in accordance with a nuanced 
interpretation of the Single Convention’s 
desire to protect the ‘health and welfare of 
mankind.’49 At present, despite UNODC’s role50 
as the Secretariat for the ad hoc committee 
to elaborate a comprehensive international 
convention on countering cybercrime, there 
is little evidence of any intention to include 
specific provision for managing international 
responses to drug cryptomarkets. 
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Recommendations:
Inform enforcement practitioners 
of the risks associated with blanket 
takedown approaches
Target only vendors and markets that 
facilitate the distribution of the most 
injurious of substances 
Recognise and prioritise harm 
reduction potential of markets 
Leverage UNODC’s unique position to 
ensure inclusion of specific provision 
for DCM policy - informed by diverse 
actors including enforcement, civil 
society, and academia - in any new 
cybercrime treaty
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